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 Abstract  Leading human rights treaties permit states as a temporary measure to 
suspend a variety of human rights guarantees during national crises. This chapter 
argues that human rights derogation is best justifi ed as a temporary mechanism for 
empowering states to protect human rights, rather than as a device for enabling 
national authorities to advance their own interests in a manner that compromises 
human rights protection. Human rights treaties use broad legal standards to entrust 
states with responsibility for deciding what measures are best calculated to max-
imise human right protection during emergencies. For this delegation of author-
ity to operate effectively, international tribunals must accord a healthy measure 
of deference to state derogations. Deference to state derogations is not warranted, 
however, if circumstances suggest that national authorities are not prepared to 
serve as impartial, rights-optimising trustees for their people. 
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 8.1  Introduction 
 International human rights law ( HRL ) obligates states to respect, protect, and ful-
fi ll basic norms of humane treatment, but few of these requirements are set in 
stone. Many human rights treaties contain limitation clauses, which permit states 
to restrict the protection afforded by various human rights in deference to impor-
tant values such as public health and safety. 1 Derogation clauses likewise permit 
states to suspend various civil and political rights during public emergencies. 2 
Most economic and social rights are framed as aspirational standards that states 
agree to pursue without committing to any singular pathway for the ‘progressive 
realization’ of these rights. 3 Indeed, only a handful of human rights such as the 
prohibitions against slavery, genocide, and torture are widely accepted as peremp-
tory norms that bind all states at all times and in all circumstances. 4 As a result, 
most human rights norms are subject to dynamic application over time, allowing 
states to adapt human rights protection to changing circumstances. 
 How  HRL responds to public emergencies, in particular, challenges the idea that 
human rights are timeless and unchanging entitlements that human beings may claim 
at all times and in all circumstances. By  authorising states to derogate from certain 
human rights commitments during public emergencies, leading human rights agree-
ments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR ), 5 the 
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), 6 the Arab Charter 
of Human Rights (Arab Charter), 7 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
1
  See, e.g., Articles 14(1), 19, 21, 22 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 999  UNTS 171 (hereinafter  ICCPR ); Article 4 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993  UNTS 3 (hereinafter  ICESCR ). 
 
2
  See, e.g., Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
 
3
  See, e.g., Article 2  ICESCR . 
 
4
  See, e.g., Article 4(2)  ICCPR . 
 
5
  See Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
 
6
  See Article 27(1) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 1144  UNTS 123 (here-
inafter American Convention). 
 
7
  See Article 4(1) of the 2004 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, reprinted in 12 
International Human Rights Report 893 (2005) (hereinafter Arab Charter). 
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and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) 8 effectively allow states to 
design their own temporary, ad hoc human rights regimes. 
 How should the international community ensure that states do not abuse this 
authority to suspend human rights norms? In his classic monograph,  The Concept 
of Law , H.L.A. Hart outlines three techniques that a legal system might employ to 
regulate injurious conduct. 9 First, a legal system could establish bright-line rules to 
identify and prohibit specifi c harmful activities in advance. Second, a legal system 
could establish broad standards and delegate ‘to an administrative, rule-making 
body… the task of fashioning rules adapted to their special needs.’ 10 Third, where 
‘it is impossible to identify a class of specifi c actions to be uniformly done or for-
borne’, a legal system could establish a broad standard of ‘reasonable’ conduct and 
require regulated parties to satisfy this standard ‘ before it has been’ fully specifi ed 
by a lawmaking or adjudicatory body. 11 The delegation of rule-specifying authority 
to administrators and courts enables a legal system to tailor the application of open-
textured legal standards to specifi c factual contexts in a more nuanced manner. 12 
 Human rights regimes employ a mix of rules and standards to regulate derogation 
during public emergencies. Some derogation norms are plainly rule-like, including 
the requirements that states issue an offi cial notice of derogation, refrain from invidi-
ous discrimination, and satisfy their other international obligations. 13 These rules, 
which limit the choices available to national authorities  ex ante , advance rule of law 
values by providing ‘the advantages of predictability, stability, and constraint’. 14 
Nonetheless, the heart of human rights derogation regimes consists of open-textured 
standards that require further specifi cation. When national crises prompt states to 
consider human rights derogation, the states must decide whether suspending ordi-
nary human rights safeguards is ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.’ 15 
This strict-necessity standard demands case-specifi c analysis. In Hart’s typology of 
regulatory regimes, it raises the question whether national authorities or international 
treaty bodies should be understood to bear primary responsibility for translating the 
standard into rules tailored to a particular crisis. Should derogation provisions be 
understood primarily as delegations of lawmaking authority to states to decide when, 
and to what extent, derogation is ‘strictly necessary’? Or should these provisions be 
viewed primarily as delegations to international human courts and commissions, the 
institutions that are responsible for supervising state human rights compliance? 
 
8
  See Article 15(1) of the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 213  UNTS 221 (hereinafter European Convention). 
 
9
  See generally Hart  2012 , Chap.  VII . 
 
10
  Ibid., at 131. 
 
11
  Ibid., at 132. 
 
12
  See  Kaplow  1992 , at 559 (distinguishing rules from standards based on ‘whether the law is 
given content ex ante or ex post’). 
 
13
  See, e.g., Article 4  ICCPR . 
 
14
  Schauer  2013 , at 1191. 
 
15
  Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
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 International opinion on this question remains divided. Some subscribe to the 
view that  HRL entrusts international treaty bodies with ultimate responsibility for 
determining how derogation standards apply to particular emergencies. According 
to this model, human rights derogation refl ects a limited concession to ‘reason of 
state’ ( raison d’ etat )—a safety valve that a state may use when its existential interest 
in self-preservation clashes with its positive human rights commitments to its peo-
ple. 16 If a state’s survival as a political community is in jeopardy, the state may der-
ogate from its human rights commitments temporarily to the extent strictly 
necessary to ensure its own survival. Robust scrutiny by international treaty bodies 
is necessary, under this account, to mitigate the confl icts of interest arise between 
public institutions and political elites, whose survival is preserved, and their people, 
whose  derogable human rights are sacrifi ced, during national crises. By asserting 
the ultimate prerogative to decide how general derogation standards apply to par-
ticular emergencies, international treaty bodies intercede as neutral arbiters between 
a state and its people to protect the integrity of  HRL against erosion in state practice. 
 A second tradition,  realised most fully in the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights ( ECtHR ), offers a markedly different account of human rights der-
ogation. The second tradition suggests that the purpose of derogation provisions is 
to empower national authorities to protect human rights  more effectively, not less. 
During a genuine public emergency, circumstances may arise where a state’s strict 
fi delity to some  derogable human commitments (e.g., freedom of assembly) might 
hamper its efforts to protect  nonderogable rights (e.g., the right to life). Far from rep-
resenting a cynical concession to the practical limits of law as a constraint on state 
power, this second tradition views derogation as a mechanism for optimising human 
rights protection overall in times where human rights norms temporarily confl ict 
with one another. By entrusting national authorities with responsibility to recalibrate 
human rights protections for particular public emergencies, this tradition acknowl-
edges the international community’s reliance on national authorities to fully  realise 
 HRL ’s overarching aspirations. The  ECtHR ’s controversial ‘margin of appreciation’ 
doctrine resonates with this account insofar as it invites international treaty bodies to 
respect national authorities as the primary trustees for humanity. 
 This chapter explores these two traditions in human rights theory and practice. 
Section  8.2 considers how the legal standards in human rights derogation provisions 
might function alternatively as delegations of rulemaking authority to states, on the one 
hand, or to international treaty bodies, on the other. Section  8.3 defends the view that 
human rights derogation is best justifi ed as a temporary mechanism for empowering 
states to protect human rights, rather than as a device for enabling national authori-
ties to advance their interests in a manner that compromises human rights protection. 
Section  8.4 considers how this rights-optimising conception of human rights deroga-
tion should inform the approach that international treaty bodies such as the  ECtHR , 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ( IACtHR ), and the UN Human Rights 
 
16
  See, e.g., The  Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in 7 Human Rights Quarterly 3 
1985 (hereinafter  Siracusa Principles). 
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Committee ( UNHRC ) take in reviewing human rights derogations. Although this arti-
cle defends the margin of appreciation doctrine, it argues that deference to national 
authorities should be tempered, if not abandoned altogether, in contexts such as domes-
tic counterinsurgency where confl icts of interest disqualify national authorities from 
serving as neutral, rights-optimizing trustees for their people. A somewhat counterin-
tuitive lesson of this approach is that the margin of appreciation doctrine may be least 
justifi ed in national crises where the life of the state itself is most acutely threatened. 
 8.2  The Resilience of Derogation Standards 
 Human rights treaties such as the  ICCPR , the American Convention, the Arab 
Charter, and the European Convention are widely understood to employ a multi-
step inquiry to determine whether states may derogate from their human rights obli-
gations. The fi rst step is to consider whether the applicable convention designates a 
particular human rights norm as being subject to derogation. 17 Second, assuming 
the human rights norm in question is  derogable , states are required under each 
agreement to provide notice concerning the scope of their derogation. 18 Third, each 
of these agreements contemplates that states may suspend ordinary human rights 
protections only temporarily during ‘public emergencies’. 19 Fourth, each agreement 
restricts human rights derogation to circumstances where this extraordinary meas-
ure is ‘strictly required’ by the exigencies of the crisis, 20 are consistent with their 
other international obligations, and do not refl ect invidious discrimination. 21 
 Legal standards comprise the heart of human rights derogation regimes. In deter-
mining whether a genuine ‘public emergency’ exists at step three, the  ICCPR , the 
Arab Charter, and the European Convention each permit derogation only when exi-
gent circumstances pose a demonstrable threat to ‘the life of the nation’. 22 The 
American Convention uses a slightly different, but similarly broad formulation, requir-
ing states to show that a ‘war, public danger, or other emergency’ threatens the ‘inde-
pendence or security of a State Party’. 23 Because these instruments do not defi ne key 
terms such as ‘life of the nation’, ‘public danger’, or ‘independence and security’, they 
 
17
  See Article 4(1)–(2) Arab Charter; Article 27(1)–(2) American Convention; Article 15(1)–(2) 
European Convention; Article 4(1)-(2)  ICCPR . 
 
18
  See Article 4(3) Arab Charter; Article 27(3) American Convention; Article 15(3) European 
Convention; Article 4(3)  ICCPR . 
 
19
  See Article 4 Arab Charter; Article 27 American Convention; Article 15(1) European 
Convention; Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
 
20
  See Article 4(1) Arab Charter; Article 27(1) American Convention; Article 15(1) European 
Convention; Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
 
21
  See, e.g., Article 4(1) Arab Charter; Article 27(1) American Convention; Article 15(1) 
European Convention; Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
 
22
  See Article 4(1)  ICCPR ; Article 15(1) European Convention; Article 4(1) Arab Charter. 
 
23
  Article 27(1) American Convention. 
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force national authorities and international tribunals to exercise judgment in deciding 
whether a particular national crisis qualifi es as a full-fl edged ‘public emergency’. 
 Step four follows a similar pattern. The  ICCPR , Arab Charter, and European 
Convention state simply that the extent of a state’s derogation must be ‘strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation’. 24 The American Convention also pro-
vides that derogation must be ‘strictly required’ to preserve the ‘independence or 
security of a State Party’. 25 These standards do not pre-commit states to any par-
ticular responsive measures  ex ante ; they simply invite states to tailor their deroga-
tion from human rights norms in response to the unique demands of particular 
emergencies. Thus, in several crucial respects, the  ICCPR , American Convention, 
Arab Charter, and European Convention all rely on open-textured legal standards 
to regulate states’ recourse to derogation during public emergencies. 26 
 To be ripe for enforcement, the legal standards that govern human rights derogation 
require translation into more specifi c rules. As Hart recognised, this process can pro-
ceed along one of two tracks. 27 First, derogation standards could function as delega-
tions of rule-making authority to administrative bodies, which would then bear the 
responsibility to determine how the standards will apply to particular public emergen-
cies. In the context of human rights derogation, this rule-making function could be 
carried out by international treaty bodies before a crisis arises, or it could be accom-
plished by national authorities issuing a notice of derogation at the time they confront 
an emerging crisis. Such measures have the advantage of providing specifi c guidance 
to rights-holders before emergency measures are deployed. The obvious disadvantage 
is that rules established  ex ante may prove insuffi ciently supple to adapt to the com-
plex and dynamic challenges that arise during a rapidly evolving crisis. As an alterna-
tive to rule-making, derogation standards could be understood as  de facto delegations 
to international treaty bodies for post hoc review. This approach may offer less specifi c 
direction to national actors and human rights-holders  ex ante , but it would enable  HRL 
to tailor its rules more closely to the precise contours of a particular problem  ex post . 28 
 Each of these approaches fi nds support in the practice of international treaty 
bodies. Human rights derogation standards have been treated at times as delega-
tions of rule-making authority to international commissions, 29 as delegations of 
 
24
  Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
 
25
  Article 27(1) American Convention. 
 
26
  Of course, there are also signifi cant differences between these instruments, including their 
descriptions of the types of emergencies that support derogation, the information that must be 
conveyed in a notice of derogation, and the specifi c human rights norms that they identify as 
 derogable or  nonderogable . Other human rights instruments such as the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights do not contain derogation clauses. 
 
27
  See Hart  2012 , Chap.  VII . 
 
28
  Legal standards that resist specifi cation both  ex ante (through rulemaking) and  ex post 
(through adjudication) effectively become non-justiciable political questions. 
 
29
  See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 5: Derogations (Article 4), 
U.N. Doc.  HRI / GEN /1/Rev. 9, May 27, 2008 (hereinafter General Comment 5); Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc.  CCPR /C/21/
Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001 (hereinafter General Comment 29). 
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rule-making authority to states, 30 and as delegations of adjudicatory authority to 
international human rights tribunals. 31 
 Consider fi rst the option of treating derogation standards as delegations for rule-
making. None of the major human rights treaties expressly  authorises an administra-
tive body to promulgate rules to implement broadly formulated derogation 
standards. The closest any of these instruments comes to delegating rule-making 
power is Article 40(4)  ICCPR , which  authorises the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
( HRC ) to provide ‘general comments’ when states report on their human rights prac-
tices. 32 The  HRC has used its general comment authority on two occasions to clarify 
the  ICCPR ’s derogation standards. 33 While not technically an exercise of administra-
tive rule-making, these general comments serve in practice as guidance documents 
that clarify the  HRC ’s views regarding the general application of  ICCPR standards. 
For the most part, however, these general comments have preserved the context-sen-
sitive, standard-based structure of Article 4  ICCPR . For example, while the  HRC has 
characterized derogation as an ‘exceptional and temporary’ measure that can be 
taken only in response to a ‘threat to the life of the nation’, 34 it has not defi ned pre-
cisely how a state should ascertain whether a particular disturbance constitutes a 
‘threat to the life of the nation’. Nor has the  HRC developed bright-line rules for 
evaluating what measures a state may employ in derogation of its human rights com-
mitments. Instead, the  HRC has stated simply that emergency measures must be nec-
essary and proportionate to restore a ‘state of normalcy where full respect for the 
Covenant can again be secured.’ 35 These guidelines are quintessential standards that 
defer the task of context-sensitive rule-specifi cation for downstream actors. 36 
 
30
  See, e.g.,  Murray v. United Kingdom , No. 14310/88, 28 October 1994, para 90;  Ireland v. the 
United Kingdom ,  ECtHR , No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, para 207. 
 
31
  See, e.g., Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 7(6) American 
Convention),  IACtHR , Advisory Opinion  OC -8/87, 30 January 1987. 
 
32
  Article 40(4)  ICCPR . 
 
33
  See General Comment 5; General Comment 29. 
 
34
  General Comment 5, para 3; General Comment 29, para 2. 
 
35
  General Comment 29,  paras 1, 3. 
 
36
  To the extent that the  HRC has introduced bright-line rules for human rights derogation, these 
rules can be divided into two relatively narrow categories. First, the Committee has endeavored 
to clarify how  nonderogable human rights norms apply to emergencies, affi rming,  inter  alia , that 
the prohibition against ‘unacknowledged detention’ and ‘fundamental requirements of a fair trial’ 
such as the presumption of innocence ‘must be respected during a state of emergency’. Ibid., 
 paras 13(b) and 16. Second, the  HRC has introduced a number of bright-line rules for deroga-
tion procedures. According to the  HRC , this notice ‘should include full information about the 
measures taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for them, with full documentation attached 
regarding their law.’ Ibid., para 17. See also General Comment 29, para 2 (emphasising that a 
‘State party must have offi cially proclaimed a state of emergency’ to honor ‘principles of legality 
and rule of law at times when they are most needed’). 
 Legal experts have proposed additional norms, principles, and procedures to guide future 
human rights derogation. See, e.g.,  Siracusa Principles, at 7,  paras 23–30 (proposing, inter  alia , 
that a crisis must affect the whole population in all or part of a state’s territory, not ‘merely local 
or relatively isolated threats,’ and threaten a state’s physical integrity or political independence to 
qualify as a genuine ‘public emergency’). 
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 On several occasions, human rights courts have used case-by-case adjudication 
to generate rules for prospective application in future cases. For example, in the 
 Greek Case ( Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece ), 37 the 
 ECtHR held that a national crisis must satisfy four criteria to qualify as a genuine 
‘public emergency’: (1) the threat must be actual or imminent; (2) its effects must 
involve the whole nation; (3) the continuance of the organised life of the commu-
nity must be threatened; and (4) the crisis or danger must be exceptional, in the 
sense that normal limitations on human rights are inadequate. 38 Although 
announced in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding, and formally lacking  prec-
edential authority, these criteria were widely perceived to give the European 
Convention’s derogation regime a harder rule-like edge, providing guidance to 
states in anticipation of future crises. Subsequent years have witnessed a softening 
of these rule-like criteria, however, as the  ECtHR has reformulated the criteria to 
maintain a more standard-based derogation regime. 
 Illustrative of these trends is the  ECtHR ’s 2009 decision in  A and Others v. 
United Kingdom . 39 In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City 
and Washington, D.C., the United Kingdom declared a public emergency and 
enacted new legislation, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The 
purpose of the Act was to address the ‘continuing’ threat that international ter-
rorism posed for residents of the United Kingdom. 40 To this end, the Act  author-
ised the arrest and prolonged detention of foreign nationals who might pose 
security threats but who, for one reason or another, could not be removed or 
deported from the country.  Recognising that this measure may be inconsistent 
with the human ‘right to liberty and security’ as defi ned in the European 
Convention, the United Kingdom submitted notice that it ‘had decided to avail 
itself of the right of derogation.’ 41 
 Eleven individuals later challenged their detention before the  ECtHR , arguing 
that the United Kingdom’s derogation did not satisfy the European Convention 
because,  inter  alia , the emergency ‘was not of a temporary nature’. 42 Although 
neither the European Convention nor the  ICCPR expressly requires that public 
emergencies be ‘temporary’, the  ECtHR acknowledged the  HRC ’s assertion in 
General Comment No. 29 that measures derogating from the  ICCPR ‘must be of 
an exceptional and temporary nature.’ 43 Consistent with its prior decisions, how-
ever, the Court rejected the petitioners’ assertion that states bear a burden to estab-
lish that the exigent circumstances necessitating human rights derogation are 
temporary. The Court acknowledged that ‘the duration of [an] emergency’ may be 
 
37
  Greek Case ,  ECtHR ,  Nos . 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, 5 November 1969, para 113. 
 
38
  Greek Case ,  ECtHR ,  Nos . 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, 5 November 1969. 
 
39
  A & Others v. United Kingdom ,  ECtHR , No. 3455/05, 19 February 2009. 
 
40
  Ibid., para 11. 
 
41
  Ibid. 
 
42
  Ibid., para 175. 
 
43
  Ibid.,  paras 110, 178. See generally General Comment No 29, para 2. 
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relevant when evaluating the ‘proportionality of [a state’s] response’, but it 
stressed that even entrenched national crises such as the United Kingdom’s dec-
ades-long counter-terrorism campaign in Northern Ireland and Turkey’s longstand-
ing counterinsurgency operations against  Kurdish separatists could support 
derogation if responsive measures were strictly necessary and proportional to the 
threat. 44 According to the Court, states do not bear a burden to establish that their 
emergency measures will be of a fi xed duration; they need only commit to lift the 
emergency measures whenever the threat to ‘the life of the nation’ disappears or 
the measures taken are no longer strictly necessary and proportional to address the 
threat. Thus, rather than impose a bright-line temporariness rule that would unduly 
inhibit states’ capacity to fulfi ll their responsibility to protect, the Court in  A and 
Others wisely focused instead on the principles of necessity and proportionality—
context-sensitive legal standards that are more fi nely attuned to the altruistic legal 
relationship that  HRL ordains. 
 The Court’s rule-skepticism in  A and Others was not limited to whether 
emergency measures must be ‘temporary’. In the course of its decision, the 
Court also called into question several rule-like features of the European 
Commission’s four-factor test from the  Greek Case . For example, the Court 
offered a fl exible interpretation of the requirement that terrorist attacks must be 
‘imminent’ to support human rights derogation. Although the United Kingdom 
made the case that a terrorist attack ‘might be committed without warning at any 
time’, it did not establish that any particular attack was actually imminent. 45 Nor 
could it reasonably do so, given the uncertain nature of the threat. In recognition 
of this fact, the Court softened the imminence criterion’s edges—giving it a 
more standard-like character—to permit derogation in response to attacks of an 
indeterminate, but reasonably foreseeable, character. The Court also rejected the 
European Commission’s suggestion that exigent circumstances must threaten 
‘institutions of government’ or a state’s ‘existence as a political community’ to 
qualify for human rights derogation. According to the Court, the prospect of sig-
nifi cant civilian casualties alone within a single zone of a single city would suf-
fi ce to demonstrate a threat to ‘the life of the nation’ justifying emergency 
measures. 46 In each of these respects, the Court systematically dismantled rules 
 
44
  A and Others v. United Kingdom ,  ECtHR , No. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para 178 (citing 
 Ireland v. United Kingdom ,  Brannigan v.  McBride , and  Marshall v. United Kingdom). 
 
45
  Ibid., para 177. For an argument that no threat to the life of the nation was ‘imminent’, see 
also Hughes  2007 , at 54. 
 
46
  A and Others v. United Kingdom ,  ECtHR , No. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para 179 (citing 
the July 2005 suicide bombings in central London). See also  Macdonald  1997 . ‘The Convention 
should not be interpreted in a way that prevents states from taking action to avert the aggravation 
of localized emergencies.’  Macdonald  1997 , at 240. 
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from the  Greek Case, affi rming the need to preserve a more fl exible, standard-
based approach. 47 
 International tribunals have been even less willing to impose fi xed rules for 
determining which particular measures are ‘strictly necessary’ to resolve an emer-
gency. Generally speaking, courts and commissions appear to accept that the 
‘strict necessity’ requirement, which constrains state responses to emergencies, is 
not well-suited to a priori evaluation outside the context of particular emergencies. 
Thus, despite the international community’s episodic efforts to fashion more deter-
minate rules for human rights derogation, the emergency regimes of the  ICCPR , 
American Convention, Arab Charter, and European Convention remain persis-
tently standard-based at their core. 
 8.3  Derogation Standards as Delegations 
 The resiliency of  HRL ’s derogation standards means that evaluating whether, or to 
what extent, human rights may be suspended during emergencies continues to be 
a case-specifi c inquiry. Rather than develop an exhaustive code of rules to regu-
late emergencies  ex ante ,  HRL allows states to formulate emergency measures in 
response to the unique circumstances of particular national crises, and it  author-
ises human rights tribunals to review these measures for compliance with the 
applicable standards. What remains unclear, and deeply controversial, is whether 
the broad standards in human rights derogation provisions should be understood 
primarily as delegations of rule-specifying authority to national authorities, the 
fi rst-responders during times of national crisis, or to international treaty bodies, 
the institutions charged with supervising state performance. Before answering this 
question, however, it may be helpful to lay the groundwork by offering some gen-
eral observations about how  HRL uses legal standards to structure the juridical 
relationship between states and their people. 
 Legal theorists have long recognised that a legal system’s choice between rules 
and standards is not merely a technical question of effi cient regulatory design, but 
may also refl ect a normative vision for the parties’ legal relationship. For example, 
Duncan Kennedy has argued that the distinction between rules and standards 
 
47
  One plausible reading of  A and Others is that the decision collapses steps three and four of 
the Court’s traditional analysis for evaluating human rights derogation into a single inquiry: 
states may derogate from their human rights commitments whenever such measures are ‘strictly 
required’ to guarantee basic security under the rule of law for their people. On this reading, 
whether a ‘public emergency’ exists is no longer an independent legal requirement but a legal 
conclusion that follows from the application of  HRL ’s strict-necessity standard. Under the logic 
of  A and Others , therefore, a crisis constitutes a genuine ‘public emergency’ if derogation is 
strictly necessary to satisfy the state’s sovereign responsibility to protect its people. Cf.  Sheeran 
 2013 , at 553 (proposing that courts treat the existence of a ‘public emergency’ as a political 
question). 
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refl ects a jurisprudential divide between legal regimes that are based on a spirit of 
‘individualism’ versus those that are based on a spirit of ‘altruism’. 48 In regimes 
based on individualism, regulated parties are free to pursue their own ends, subject 
only to constraints that they or their sovereign affi rmatively impose  ex ante . 
Generally speaking, the common law of contract is an individualistic regime. 
Contracting parties are presumed to engage in ‘arms-length’ negotiation, each pur-
suing their own interests, and each bound to pursue their  counterparty ’s interest 
only to the extent that discrete duties have been specifi ed by agreement in 
advance. Beyond these contractual duties, contracting parties are free to pursue 
their own self-interest; they bear no obligation to make further accommodations 
for the changing interests of their  counterparty . 
 A jurisprudence of altruism, in contrast, views regulated parties as bearing rela-
tional obligations of affi rmative devotion to use entrusted authority to pursue oth-
ers’ ends, not merely their own. The paradigmatic private-law example of a 
jurisprudence of altruism is the law of fi duciaries, which requires regulated parties 
to use their discretionary power over the legal or practical interests of their benefi -
ciaries for the exclusive benefi t of their benefi ciaries. 49 As Daniel  Markovits has 
explained, fi duciaries are retained to take  initiative on behalf of their benefi ciaries, 
not merely to comply with rules fi xed  ex ante . Hence,
 [f] iduciary duties of loyalty and care … refl ect a natural response to the structural prob-
lems out of which fi duciary relations generally arise. A fi duciary relation becomes appeal-
ing partly because a principal requires her agent to act in ways that she cannot 
substantially specify  ex ante and cannot directly evaluate  ex post . In such cases, fi duciary 
obligation substitutes for the specifi cation of contract duties and the verifi cation of 
performance. 50 
 Because fi duciary relationships are dynamic, and because the temptations for 
opportunism and shirking that arise in such relationships cannot be fully speci-
fi ed in advance, the law relies on standards to fi ll in the details  ex post . On this 
view, standards are the tools that legal systems employ to encode a jurisprudence 
of altruism. 
 Of course, identifying rules with individualism and standards with altruism is 
too tidy, and Kennedy’s thesis has been justly  criticised for over-simplifying the 
rule/standard dynamic. As critics have noted, individualist regimes commonly 
deploy standards in contexts where the complexity or uncertainty of a particular 
environment would prevent rules from safeguarding the parties’ respective inter-
ests. Conversely, altruist regimes often use rules to underscore parties’ other-
regarding obligations and enhance coordination. 51 Indeed, arguably the defi ning 
feature of fi duciary relationships is a bright-line rule: the ‘duty of loyalty’, which 
prohibits fi duciaries from engaging in self-interested transactions without their 
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  Schlag  1985 , at 420. 
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benefi ciaries’ consent. 52 Like individualistic regimes, altruistic regimes also com-
monly employ rules to set technical or procedural baselines that facilitate external 
monitoring and judicial review. 53 Thus, the mere fact that a particular legal regime 
employs rules or standards does not, in and of itself, establish that it has an indi-
vidualistic or altruistic character. 
 Although Kennedy’s claim about the relationship between legal standards and 
altruism is problematic, it does offer an important insight: when individualistic 
and altruistic regimes deploy legal standards, they take very different approaches 
to downstream rule-production. In individualistic regimes, neither party  authorises 
the other to defi ne how open-ended legal standards apply in particular circum-
stances; rather, legal standards serve as delegations of authority exclusively to 
courts to resolve any disputes between the parties about the interpretation or appli-
cation of law. In contrast, legal standards operate very differently in altruistic 
regimes, which entrust one party with discretionary power to take initiative for the 
benefi t of another. In altruistic regimes, parties and courts serve as co-delegates of 
rule-making power: the entrusted party (e.g., corporate offi cer, administrative 
agency) bears primary responsibility for translating broad legal standards into 
administrable rules, but courts supervise to address abuses of this discretion. 
Courts routinely accord a measure of deference, therefore, when they review the 
entrusted party’s actions. For example, U.S. courts review corporate offi cers’ com-
pliance with the ‘duty of care’ very deferentially, thereby affi rming that corporate 
offi cers—not courts—are primarily responsible for determining what measures are 
best calculated to advance the interests of their shareholders. 54 Similarly, in 
administrative law, national courts tend to pay considerable deference to adminis-
trative agencies, treating ambiguous standards in legislation as delegations of 
authority to agencies to decide what measures are best suited to advance public 
interests. 55 Individualistic and altruistic legal regimes thus refl ect different 
assumptions about whether standards refl ect delegations of authority to the parties, 
to courts, or both. 
 Does  HRL refl ect a jurisprudence of individualism or altruism? Human rights 
obligations are often characterised as individualistic constraints on states’ sover-
eign independence. When states covenant to refrain from outrages against human 
dignity such as arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, and torture, they pur-
portedly assume obligations that have an objective character.  HRL does not confer 
discretion on national authorities to decide once and for all what these obligations 
entail; although states will necessarily take the fi rst cut at these questions,  HRL 
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  See Restatement (Second) of Agency , 1958, § 387 (describing fi duciaries’ obligation to ben-
efi ciaries primarily as a duty ‘to act solely for the benefi t of the principal in all matters connected 
with his agency’). 
 
53
  See  Kaplow  1992 , at 563–564. 
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  For discussing the business-judgment rule in corporate law, see  Aronson v. Lewis , 473 A.2d 
805, 1 March 1984, at 812. 
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  See, e.g.,  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 1984, at 
843–844. 
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commits the ultimate responsibility for defi ning the content and application of 
 HRL norms to international courts and commissions. 
 This account of  HRL as an individualistic regime is plausible in some respects, 
but it is diffi cult to square with some core features of  HRL . While it is certainly 
true that states bear negative duties under  HRL to respect various human rights 
prohibitions, and these duties are facially compatible with a jurisprudence of indi-
vidualism, these duties are equally compatible with a jurisprudence of altruism. 56 
Moreover,  HRL also places states under affi rmative duties to protect and fulfi ll 
human rights—duties that require national authorities to set aside their own self-
interest to pursue the interests of their people. This is most obviously true for eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, which commit states to use the resources at their 
disposal to develop and implement a coordinated plan for advancing the economic, 
social, and cultural well-being of their people. 57 But it is equally true of civil and 
political rights. Under the  ICCPR , for example, it is not enough for states to refrain 
from imposing slavery upon their people; they must also ‘ensure’ respect for the 
prohibition by adopting laws that prohibit slavery and by prosecuting violations of 
these laws within their jurisdictions. 58 States are expected to take initiative to 
develop institutions, policies, and procedures in order to satisfy the  ICCPR ’s direc-
tive that ‘[n]o one shall be held in slavery’, ‘servitude’, or ‘forced or compulsory 
labor’. 59 The case law developed by the  ECtHR supports this altruistic vision by 
requiring states to take action so that the benefi ciaries of the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Convention are able to enjoy these legal protections effectively. 60 
In practice, of course, eradicating slavery and other forms of human traffi cking has 
proven to be a thorny challenge for even the most affl uent and conscientious states. 
Nonetheless, like agents or trustees in private fi duciary law, states under  HRL bear 
broad obligations of affi rmative devotion to use their powers and resources altruis-
tically to protect and fulfi ll human rights to achieve the progressive realisation of 
these objectives for their people. Thus, the positive, programmatic character of 
states’ obligations to respect, protect, and fulfi ll human rights  undercuts the idea 
that  HRL can be captured fully by a jurisprudence of individualism. 
 Despite these features of  HRL , some human rights lawyers have characterised 
derogation provisions in individualistic terms. 61 The purpose of derogation clauses, 
under this account, is to address the confl icts of interest that arise when national 
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  See Fox-Decent and  Criddle  2009 explaining how  nonderogable human rights norms are 
 consistent with a fi duciary conception of state authority under  HRL . 
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  See, e.g.,  Marckx v. Belgium ,  ECtHR , 6833/74, 13 June 1979, para 31 (explaining that the 
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  See, e.g.,  Chowdhury  1989 , at  58–59 (observing that the International Commission of Jurists 
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210 E.J. Criddle
crises jeopardise states’ existential interest in self-preservation. By permitting 
national authorities to invoke ‘the life of the nation’ 62 or the ‘independence or 
security of a State Party’ 63 as a trump card against certain human rights claims dur-
ing public emergencies,  HRL enables them to modify their legal obligations in set-
tings where the confl ict between their own (individualistic) interests and their 
(altruistic) legal obligations to their people are in greatest tension. Approached 
from this perspective, treating derogation standards as delegations to national 
authorities would make little sense, because it would invite national authorities to 
serve as judges and parties to the same cause. Instead, there would be a particularly 
strong case for international tribunals to conduct searching, independent review of 
human rights derogations to decide for themselves whether state derogations are 
strictly necessary to preserve the ‘life’, ‘independence’, or ‘security’ of the state. 
 This understanding of human rights derogation as a concession to  raison d’ état , 
while superfi cially plausible, has failed to attract much support among interna-
tional lawyers. Few subscribe to the idea that national authorities may use deroga-
tion as a device  solely for self-preservation, deliberately disregarding their general 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfi ll human rights for the benefi t of their peo-
ple. Instead, the dominant view has been that derogation standards such as ‘the life 
of the nation’ must be defi ned according to  human interests, not the interests of 
national authorities  per  se . 64 Far from releasing states to pursue their own inde-
pendent objectives, international human rights treaties contemplate that states will 
use derogation solely for other-regarding purposes, suspending human rights pro-
tections only to the extent strictly necessary to re-establish their capacity to protect 
and fulfi ll human rights for their people. During a time of war, for example, a state 
may fi nd it necessary to impose curfews or deny access to public roads temporar-
ily in a departure from the human ‘right to liberty of movement’ to ensure that mil-
itary personnel and supplies can travel swiftly to respond to attacks and deliver 
assistance to those in need. 65 When states take initiative in this manner to protect 
their people, their temporary derogation from other human rights commitments 
such as freedom of movement or expression may fi t commodiously within a juris-
prudence of altruism. Human rights derogation provisions and limitation provi-
sions thus share a common structure, entrusting states with responsibility to 
narrow the scope of protection temporarily for some of their people where such 
measures are strictly necessary to ‘ secur [e] due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others.’ 66 By committing responsibility to states in this 
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fashion,  HRL situates states not only as subjects of  HRL , but also, as temporary 
co-authors of  HRL during public emergencies. 
 In light of these features,  HRL standards have often been understood as dele-
gating discretionary power primarily to national authorities, with international 
treaty bodies occupying a secondary and subsidiary position. 67 By entrusting 
states with responsibility to take initiative for protecting and fulfi lling the human 
rights of their people,  HRL frames the relationship between states and their people 
in altruistic terms that are inconsistent with a rule-based legal framework. While 
some hard rules such as the prohibition against torture may be consistent with a 
jurisprudence of altruism, 68 the whole point of human rights derogation is to ena-
ble states to protect their people in contexts where  HRL ’s reliance on rules (e.g., 
negative duties to respect human rights) could prevent states from maintaining the 
conditions necessary for the protection and  fulfi lment of human rights for all. A 
derogation regime that relied upon rules to defi ne when a ‘public emergency’ 
existed would simply replicate the rule-rigidity problem that the derogation regime 
itself was designed to solve. Moreover, as a practical matter, any effort to devise 
comprehensive rules for human rights derogation must come to grips with the fact 
that, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, ‘it is impossible to foresee or to defi ne the 
extent and variety of national emergencies, and the correspondent extent and vari-
ety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infi nite.’ 69 The error costs associated with a 
rule-bound regime are therefore likely to be unacceptably high ‘relative to the per-
formance of a fully informed and fully competent  decisionmaker using a stand-
ard.’ 70 If derogation is strictly necessary to maximise human rights protection 
during an emergency, shackling states to legal rules established  ex ante has the 
potential to unduly compromise their ability to protect their people. To the extent, 
therefore, that  HRL entrusts states with responsibility to act altruistically for the 
benefi t of their people, it also demands a derogation regime with the fl exibility and 
dynamism that only standards can supply. 
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 8.4  Deference for an Altruistic Regime 
 If legal standards are indispensable tools for regulating human rights derogation, 
how should international law translate these standards into rules? Should deroga-
tion standards be understood primarily as delegations of rule-making authority to 
international courts and commissions? Or should they be construed as delegations 
to states to develop ‘rules adapted to their special needs’? 71 
 How a particular legal regime translates legal standards into rules reveals much 
about its jurisprudential commitments. Individualistic regimes tend to reject the 
idea that standards authorise a regulated party to fashion rules of its own design. In 
relationships governed by ordinary contractual principles, for example, the exer-
cise of unilateral rule-making power by either party would undermine the regime’s 
underlying premise of normative individualism. Responsibility therefore falls to 
the courts to translate the legal standards enshrined in contracts into discrete rules 
that would govern the respective rights and liabilities of the parties. 
 The same cannot be said of legal regimes that are premised on a jurisprudence of 
altruism. Because altruistic regimes entrust a party with discretionary power for the 
purpose of enabling the entrusted party to take initiative affi rmatively for the benefi t 
of another, the entrusted party serves as the primary delegate for  realising the aspira-
tions that are encoded in legal standards. 72 In altruistic regimes, legal standards 
carve out a space within which the entrusted party may exercise discretionary power 
for the benefi t of others. 73 Courts, in contrast, play a comparatively modest, subsidi-
ary role in altruistic regimes. Courts are not responsible for translating legal stand-
ards into specifi c rules, thereby directing precisely how an entrusted party should 
exercise discretionary power; rather, courts are  tasked with merely policing the outer 
limits of an entrusted party’s rule-making power. Judicial intervention becomes nec-
essary where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion—for example, where an 
entrusted party has ignored or unreasonably applied relevant standards, has engaged 
in self-interested behaviour, has declined to treat their benefi ciaries even- handedly , 
or has employed a patently inadequate decision-making process. 
 Taken at face value, some pronouncements from international human rights 
courts appear to reject the altruistic approach in favour of judicial administration 
of derogation standards. In  Brannigan and  McBride v. United Kingdom , for exam-
ple, the  ECtHR explained that ‘judicial control of interference by the executive 
with the individual’s right to liberty … is implied by one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of a democratic society, namely the rule of law.’ 74 Hence, ‘it is ultimately 
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for the Court to rule whether the measures were “strictly required”’, including 
(1) whether a derogating measure ‘was a genuine response to the emergency situa-
tion’, (2) whether ‘it was fully justifi ed by the special circumstances of the emer-
gency’, and (3) whether ‘adequate safeguards were provided against abuse’. 75 
Taken out of context, statements such as these may convey the (false) impression 
that the  ECtHR views itself as the sole delegate for translating the European 
Convention’s general standards into rules applicable to specifi c contexts. 
 The better view, however, is that the  ECtHR ’s ‘margin of appreciation’ jurispru-
dence refl ects a jurisprudence of altruism. Under the margin of appreciation doc-
trine, human rights bodies supervise state responses to public emergencies, but 
states take the lead in modifying the European Convention’s general regime to 
address grave threats to the human rights of their people. 76 In  Brannigan and 
 McBride , for example, the Court emphasised that ‘it falls to each Contracting 
State, with its responsibility for “the life of [its] nation,” to determine whether that 
life is threatened by a “public emergency” and, if so, how far it is necessary to go 
in attempting to overcome the emergency.’ 77 The Court recognised, in short, that 
international law charges states with primary responsibility for determining how 
 HRL ’s general safeguards should be modifi ed in contexts where unwavering 
adherence to these safeguards would prevent the state from protecting its people 
from grave threats. Hence,
 [i]t is not the Court’s role to substitute its view as to what measures were most appropriate 
or expedient at the relevant time in dealing with an emergency situation for that of the 
Government which have direct responsibility for establishing the balance between the tak-
ing of effective measures to [preserve the life of the nation] on the one hand, and respect-
ing individual rights on the other. 78 
 Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, it is national authorities, not the 
 ECtHR , that are entrusted with primary responsibility for designing temporary 
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human rights regimes that are adapted to the demands of particular public 
emergencies. 
 This conception of the margin of appreciation doctrine marks a signifi cant 
departure from other leading accounts of the doctrine. Some legal scholars have 
argued that the primary purpose of the margin of appreciation doctrine is to 
accommodate moral pluralism through democratic policy-making. 79 Others have 
argued that the Court employs the margin of appreciation as an accommodation to 
principles of comity, refl ecting the Court’s felt need ‘to avoid damaging confronta-
tions between the Court and Contracting States over their respective spheres of 
authority.’ 80 Yet, another strain of legal scholarship suggests that deference is war-
ranted because national authorities, ‘[b]y reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the pressing needs of the moment, … are in principle in a better posi-
tion than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emer-
gency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it.’ 81 While 
these considerations all support deference, none is suffi cient to justify the margin 
of appreciation doctrine. Concerns about democratic legitimacy, comity, and com-
parative institutional competence are plainly inadequate to support deference to 
national authorities if  HRL entrusts international treaty bodies alone with authority 
to determine whether human rights derogation satisfi es the applicable legal stand-
ards. Deference to national authorities is justifi ed only to the extent that  HRL 
entrusts national authorities as the primary agents for deciding what measures are 
necessary to protect and fulfi ll human rights during emergencies. 
 If  HRL ’s derogation standards commit rule-making power to states in the fi rst 
instance, should human rights bodies abstain from reviewing state emergency 
measures? 82 International courts have wisely resisted this option. Human rights 
treaties contemplate that international courts and commissions will play a key role 
in supervising public emergencies to ensure that national authorities do not fl a-
grantly abuse their derogation authority. 83 Deference under the margin of appreci-
ation does not necessarily mean wholesale abdication to national authorities. As 
the  ECtHR explained in  Handyside v. United Kingdom , ‘[t]he domestic margin of 
appreciation … goes hand in hand with a European supervision.’ 84 This principle 
fi nds expression, as well, in Protocol 15 amending the European Convention. 85 
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Protocol 15 ‘[a] ffi rm [s] that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and 
freedoms defi ned in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so 
they enjoy a margin of appreciation’. At the same time, however, Protocol 15 also 
stresses that states-parties remain ‘subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
[ ECtHR ]’. 86 Even under the margin of appreciation’s deferential standard, the 
‘burden lies on [states] to justify their acts’ during judicial review. 87 
 The absence of such a reasoned justifi cation is a suffi cient ground for fi nding a 
violation of the Convention. For example, in  Brannigan &  McBride v. United 
Kingdom , the Court held that the United Kingdom had abused its emergency pow-
ers by prolonging the detention and interrogation of two residents of Northern 
Ireland without an adequate justifi cation. 88 Likewise, in  Aksoy v. Turkey , the Court 
reasoned that a two-week delay in presenting a citizen-detainee before a judge 
‘exceeded the Government’s margin of appreciation’ because it ‘could not be said 
to be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.’ 89 In each of these set-
tings, the Court recognised the legitimacy of states’ primary role in fashioning 
temporary emergency measures from the European Convention’s raw standards, 
but it also underscored that states must be prepared to offer reasonable justifi ca-
tions that are worthy of respect. 90 These decisions underscore the principle that 
states ultimately bear the burden to establish a plausible factual predicate for any 
purported ‘threat to the life of the nation’ and to explain why the measures they 
have taken to deal with the crisis are reasonable applications of relevant deroga-
tion standards. 
 A corollary of this duty of reasoned justifi cation is that the  degree of deference 
accorded to national authorities under the margin of appreciation doctrine may 
depend upon the rationality and thoroughness of a state’s legal rationale. An expla-
nation that does not take into account all of the relevant legal standards, ignores 
key facts, or reaches a conclusion inconsistent with established law will qualify for 
judicial censure. 91 A state that fails to provide a rational justifi cation for human 
rights derogation would fail to meet its obligations as neutral arbiter between the 
confl icting human rights claims of its people. 92 
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 Another limitation on the margin of appreciation doctrine follows from the idea 
that  HRL enlists national authorities to author temporary regimes for the protec-
tion of human rights during public emergencies: international courts and commis-
sions should withhold deference to state derogation decisions where there are 
compelling reasons to believe that national authorities did not qualify as neutral 
arbiters. A common feature of altruistic regimes is that judicial deference is predi-
cated on a presumption that parties have acted impartially, according due regard to 
the interests of all of their benefi ciaries without regard to their own self-interest. 
Where a party has discriminated arbitrarily against some of its benefi ciaries or has 
engaged in self-interested transactions, courts will set aside the party’s decision or 
require  disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains. 93 In a similar spirit,  HRL prohibits 
states from derogating from their human rights commitments in a manner that 
refl ects discrimination against a protected group. When states suspend  derogable 
human rights such as freedom of expression, movement, or association, such 
action must be facially neutral and refl ect due regard for the potential disparate 
impact that it may have against vulnerable groups or individuals. 94 If emergency 
measures transgress these principles, the margin of appreciation doctrine simply 
does not apply. 
 Application of the margin of appreciation may also be inappropriate if national 
authorities have demonstrated a consistent disregard in the past for their basic 
human rights commitments. Although derogation provisions may empower altru-
istic governments to protect human rights more effectively during public emergen-
cies, they may also furnish a pretext for tyrannical governments to limit human 
rights protections without good cause. In deciding whether to defer to state der-
ogations, international courts need not cast a blind eye on clear evidence that 
national authorities have demonstrated a fl agrant and systematic disregard for the 
human rights of their people in other contexts. 
 Similarly, international courts and commissions should temper the margin of 
appreciation doctrine’s application in contexts where there are good reasons to 
believe that national authorities’ concerns about self-preservation are likely to 
render them unreliable agents for protecting the human rights of their people. 
To determine how much deference national authorities should receive under this 
standard, international tribunals should consider the extent to which emergency 
conditions generate confl icts between the interests of national authorities and their 
people. In a national crisis involving a threat of future terrorist attacks against 
civilian targets such as universities, power plants, or sports stadiums, interna-
tional tribunals may have relatively little cause for concern about national authori-
ties’ ability to serve as impartial arbiters in designing temporary human rights 
regimes. Absent evidence of discrimination, international tribunals may reasonably 
 
93
  See, e.g.,  Snepp v. United States , 444 U.S. 507, 19 February 1980, at 515. 
 
94
  See  Hennebel  2011 , at 60 (observing that in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, vulnerable groups that historically have been the subject of discrimination such 
as children, women, indigenous groups, and disabled persons receive ‘stronger protection’). 
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presume that when states derogate from their human rights commitments, their 
overarching purpose is to protect and fulfi ll human rights for their people. 
Conversely, when the threat to ‘the life of the nation’ comes from a domestic 
insurgency that seeks to overthrow the government itself, national institutions may 
experience greater temptation to pursue their own self-preservation in a manner 
that is not ‘strictly necessary’. While some deference to national authorities might 
still be warranted based on their greater familiarity with facts on the ground, inter-
national tribunals should review the state’s responsive measures closely to ensure 
that national authorities do not become effectively judge and party to the same 
cause. Whether international tribunals should pay deference to national authorities 
thus depends on the character of the public emergency. The greater the peril that a 
crisis poses to a government’s self-preservation, the greater may be the justifi ca-
tion for declaring a public emergency to maintain public order. On the other hand, 
the more a crisis threatens a government’s survival, the greater the threat that a 
government’s choice of responsive measures may be infected by institutional self-
interest, and thus the weaker the case may be for international tribunals to defer to 
the government’s choice of responsive measures. 
 These dynamics may help to explain and justify differences in the application 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine between the European and inter-American 
human rights systems. Unlike the  ECtHR , the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) and the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights ( IACtHR ) have not applied the margin of appreciation doctrine 
consistently in their jurisprudence. 95 The  IACtHR ’s unwillingness to apply a def-
erential standard of review arguably refl ects the fact that the  IACtHR began its 
work at a time when much of Latin America was ruled by unelected military dicta-
tors and the Court’s docket was fl ooded with cases of states using torture, forced 
disappearances, and extrajudicial killing to suppress political dissent. 96 Indeed, the 
 IACtHR has frankly acknowledged that it views human rights derogation with a 
jaundiced eye: 
 It cannot be denied that under certain circumstances the suspension of guarantees may be 
the only way to deal with emergency situations and, thereby, to preserve the highest val-
ues of a democratic society. The Court cannot, however, ignore the fact that abuses may 
result from the application of emergency measures not objectively justifi ed in the light of 
the requirements prescribed in Article 27 [of the American Convention] and the principles 
contained in other relevant international instruments. This has, in fact, been the experience 
of our hemisphere. 97 
 Given this sobering experience, it should come as no surprise that the  IACtHR has 
been reluctant to treat national authorities as altruistic agents for their people dur-
ing times of crisis. If national authorities are perceived to use human rights 
 
95
  See  Legg  2012 , at 31 (observing that the  IACtHR lacks ‘a well-established doctrine of defer-
ence” and that “a number of cases seem to imply that there will be no deference to states’). 
 
96
  See, e.g., Candia  2014 ;  Contreras  2012 , at 28. 
 
97
  Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention 
on Human Rights),  IACtHR , Advisory Opinion  OC -8/87, 30 January 1987, para 20. 
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derogation for self-interested purposes—to enhance their own leverage against 
domestic insurgents or political opponents, often during national crises of their 
own creation—the trust necessary to sustain a margin of appreciation cannot rea-
sonably be sustained. A jurisprudence of individualism focused on rules, rather 
than a standard-based jurisprudence of altruism, naturally becomes the operative 
regulatory paradigm. 98 
 The experience of the  IACtHR illustrates why the margin of appreciation doc-
trine should not be treated as all-or-nothing proposition. While human rights dero-
gation may be designed to empower states to protect human rights more 
effectively overall during public emergencies, international tribunals need not turn 
a blind eye when states are manifestly unprepared to perform this role. There is lit-
tle reason for international tribunals to apply a margin of appreciation, for exam-
ple, if national authorities within a particular state have manifested clear disregard 
for the interests of their people by engaging in a consistent pattern of grave human 
rights abuse. Similarly, the presumption that states derogate for altruistic purposes 
should be set aside in settings such as domestic counterinsurgency operations 
where national authorities’ emergency measures are susceptible to concerns for 
self-preservation. Although the altruistic character of  HRL often means granting a 
healthy margin of appreciation to national authorities, it may require international 
tribunals to withhold deference where past oppression or confl icts of interest dis-
qualify national authorities from presenting themselves as neutral, rights-optimis-
ing trustees for their people. In these settings, international tribunals will be best 
positioned to determine whether the measures a state has taken in response to a 
public emergency are ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.’ 99 
 8.5  Conclusion 
 The idea that international law needs to develop more concrete rules for human 
rights derogation has become a common refrain in legal scholarship. Given the 
frequency with which states abuse their emergency powers during national  crises, 
the yearning for more determinate rules to constrain state discretion is under-
standable. There are good reasons, however, why the international community 
 continues to employ open-textured standards to regulate human rights derogation. 
 
98
  This may help to explain why the  IACtHR has developed a more rule-focused jurisprudence 
than its European counterpart, including recognition of a greater number of human rights norms 
as ‘regional  jus  cogens .’ See, e.g.,  Roach and  Pinkerton , Case 9647,  IACHR , Resolution No 
3/87,  OEA / ser .L./V./ II .71, doc. 9 rev. 1, 22 September 1987, at 168–170 (characterising ‘execu-
tion of children’ as a  jus  cogens norm); cf.  Schauer  2013 , at 1191–1193 (noting that ‘rules can 
empower criticism in ways that standards do not’). 
 Similarly, it has been suggested that the absence of a derogation provision in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights refl ects a ‘historical legacy both in colonial and postcolo-
nial societies’ in which emergency powers were abused. See  Cowell  2013 , at 153. 
 
99
  Article 4(1)  ICCPR . 
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By  authorising states to decide when and how to derogate from their international 
obligations,  HRL entrusts states with primary responsibility to determine what 
measures are necessary to protect and fulfi ll human rights for their people dur-
ing national crises. Broad derogation standards are the mechanism  HRL employs 
to structure its jurisprudence of altruism, empowering states to design temporary 
human rights regimes that are tailored to the specifi c exigencies of particular 
national crises. The role of human rights tribunals, in contrast, is more limited: to 
ensure that states do not abuse their discretionary power by imposing self-serv-
ing, discriminatory, or arbitrary and capricious limitations on human rights. The 
controversial margin of appreciation doctrine honors this entrustment of author-
ity, ensuring that international tribunals give a healthy measure of deference to the 
context-sensitive judgments of national decision-makers during temporary crises. 
Judicial deference to national authorities should not, however, be applied indis-
criminately. If national authorities fail to support their human rights derogations 
with reasoned deliberation, if their behavior refl ects a pattern of abusive conduct, 
or if their altruistic mission has been compromised by confl icts of interest, interna-
tional tribunals should not hesitate to withhold deference. Thus, a state’s authority 
to derogate from human rights guarantees during public emergencies is condi-
tioned upon the state serving as a faithful trustee for its people. 
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